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Digital Tracking as a Political Program  
By Jeanette Hofmann 
They are just a couple weeks old and bear names like StayHomeSafe, Home Quarantine, 
Electronic Fence, AC19, Shield, Alipay Healthcode or TraceTogether. They were developed 
in China, Iran, Singapore and South Korea, Hong Kong, Israel, and in Poland. Coronavirus 
tracking apps are aimed at controlling a population's health - yet they can take quite 
different routes. In Germany, too, a possible containment of the pandemic by way of 
digital tracking technologies is currently being considered. 
The app TraceTogether, developed in Singapore, registers all encounters by people who 
spend more than 30 minutes standing less than two meters apart. It registers via 
Bluetooth and stores the information. If one of the persons involved tests positive, 
TraceTogether informs other parties and asks them to be tested as well. An app from 
South Korea goes even further: It creates a map from citizens’ movement data. It is 
publically accessible, so it allows all people to see whether they have crossed paths with 
anyone infected with the coronavirus. 
Meanwhile, the Taiwanese government has constructed an "electric fence" to ensure 
compliance with quarantine regulations. Anyone leaving the house or turning off their 
phone is reported to the police. The Polish "home quarantine app" functions in a similar 
vein, though it is based on facial recognition software: A quarantined person must 
regularly record selfies at their home. Anyone refusing the request to take a selfie within 
20 minutes faces chances of being called on by police. 
China has introduced “health passports” developed by Alibaba and Tencent. They use a 
barcode system based on a score-like assessment of potential health hazard. Utilizing 
body temperature, past whereabouts and encounters with others, different levels of risk 
appear on the smartphone as green, yellow and red color codes. Reading devices at the 
entrances and exits of buildings ensure that public spaces can only be accessed with a 
green barcode. 
Such applications aren't exactly new. Movement data and networks of contact have long 
been useful to both counter-terrorism and conventional police work. However, 
coronavirus tracking apps are now blurring the institutional boundaries separating 
health, police and security authorities. A common justification for introducing corona 
apps is the situation’s urgency and the tools’ presumed effectiveness. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has praised China's drastic measures. Many assume 
there is a causal link between strict digital control and low infection rates. In Germany, 
too, the question of whether to use phone data by radio cell interrogation in order to 
identify infectious chains is being discussed openly. Data protection is often pitted against 
the need to fight the epidemic. But do we really have to choose between fundamental 
rights and health, democracy and effective politics? 
The American historian Frank Snowden encourages us to view national epidemic control 
as a mirror of society. Measures do tend to vary considerably between political regimes. 
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Still, there is no empirical evidence that extensive testing, a good health infrastructure 
and a cooperative society willing to practice self-isolation and physical distancing aren’t 
just as effective as state-imposed surveillance. Perhaps they work even better. 
Corona apps, like the ones mentioned above, are an authoritarian regimes’ instrument of 
choice. Such regimes either cannot or do not want to rely on their citizen's willingness to 
cooperate. Intact democracies have other resources at their disposal: they can expect a 
public to critically form opinions, insight and solidarity. Further, they can expect a 
considerable proportion of their population to act cooperatively. Instead of 
complementing these feats, digital monitoring is likely to undermine them. 
Digital “tracking” of the coronavirus could be pursued by other means, voluntarily even, 
and without top-down regulation. A big topic in Germany right now is how apps can be 
used to disrupt chains of infection in a way that respects fundamental rights. Surveys 
indicate that people would be prepared to install a corona app, provided this measure is 
voluntary and, above all, respects data protection. Ideas formulated at the nationwide 
hackathon #WirVsVirus from March 20 to 22 provide ample evidence of the variety of 
possible digital solutions. On April 1, a European initiative launched a platform for a "Pan 
European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing", linking a voluntary app to an 
anonymous notification system. The great variety of corona tracking apps shows that 
even in these exceptional times, surveillance is part and parcel of a political program, not 
an imminent practical constraint, or a sign of technological determination. 
-- 
4 April 2020 
Jeanette Hofmann is head of the research group Politics of Digitalization. 
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